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SELECTION AND TENURE OF MARYLAND JUDGES:
AN EXPLANATION OF A PROPOSAL
By

ROBERT J.

MARTINEAU*

At its 68th annual meeting to be held in June, 1963,
the Maryland State Bar Association will consider a draft
of a Constitutional Amendment which if adopted will
establish an alternative procedure to that now provided
for the selection and retention of the judges of the state

judicial system. The proposed Constitutional Amendment
was drafted and its adoption is recommended by a special
Committee on Judicial Selection of the Maryland State Bar
Association, of which Eli Frank, Jr. of the Baltimore Bar
is the Chairman.'
The principal features of the proposed Amendment are,

in brief, these:
(1)

That the Governor appoint from a list of nominees
submitted by a judicial nominating commission a
person to serve as judge for a limited term;

* Of the Maryland Bar; B.S. 1956, College of the Holy Cross; J.D.
1959, University of Chicago.
'The other members of the Committee are G. C. A. Anderson of Baltimore, David E. Betts of Rockville, Chief Judge John B. Gray, Jr., of
Prince Frederick, Walter M. Jenifer of Towson, William L. Marbury of
Baltimore, Ridgely P. Melvin, 'Jr., of Annapolis, Charles Awdry Thompson
of Cambridge, and the author as Secretary. While it is attempted here to
state accurately the reasons behind the Committee's drafting of the Constitutional Amendment, this article must be considered only as the work
of a member of the Committee and not that of the Committee itself.
The Committee Was appointed by the President of the Maryland State
/Bar Association pursuant to a resolution passed at the 1962 annual
meeting of that Association. The Committee spent several months studying both the operation of the present system of selection and tenure
of judges in Maryland and the systems in existence in other states. The
Committee in its interim report to the 1963 mid-winter meeting of the
Maryland State Bar Association presented its tentative recommendations
as to the method of selection and retention of judges which it considered
ibest suited to Maryland. Subsequent to the mid-winter meeting, the
Committee has undertaken to attend meetings of local bar associations
throughout the State in order to explain its plan and to receive from the
members of these associations the benefit of their suggestions and criticisms
with respect to its proposals. The Committee then drafted a Constitutional
Amendment which would put into effect in Maryland that system which
it believes would result in the selection and retention of those best qualified
to hold judicial office - a system which combines a judicial nominating
commission procedure for the initial appointment of judges and a noncompetitive election for the retention of judges (hereinafter referred to
as the judicial nominating commission system).
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(2) That at the general election preceding the end of
that term the appointee, running "on his record"
and without an opposing candidate, be either elected
to a full term or be rejected and retired;
(3) That initially only appointments and elections to
the Court of Appeals be under this Amendment, but
that it may be made applicable to other courts by
Act of the Assembly or upon referendum vote in
the jurisdiction affected.
The proposed Amendment contains, among other things, a
number of detailed provisions relating to the representation
of the bar and of the public on judicial nominating commissions.
It is considered desirable that prior to the consideration
of the proposed Constitutional Amendment by the Maryland State Bar Association the members of the bench and
bar of Maryland and, in particular, the members of the
Association should have available a detailed explanation
of the purpose and meaning of the proposed Amendment.
The purpose of this article is primarily to explain the historical background and the terms and provisions of the
proposed Constitutional Amendment rather than to present
a brief or argument for its adoption. It is hoped, however,
that the better and more widely the proposals are known
and understood, the more they will commend themselves
to favorable consideration.'
2 Although a discussion of the merits of the various arguments for and
against the judicial nominating commission system which the Committee
proposes be adopted in ,Maryland is beyond the scope of this article, it
might be a convenience here to list the usual arguments made for and
against this type of judicial selection system. The arguments most often
heard in support of such a system are the following: (1) The purpose of
a judicial selection process should be to select and retain in office those
persons best qualified to hold such office; (2) Neither the traditional
executive appointment system nor the partisan or non-partisan elective
system is designed to achieve this result; (3) The sole purpose of the
judicial nominating commission system is to select and retain the best
judges; (4) Under other systems qualified judges are selected not as a
result of such systems but rather in spite of them; (5) Although political
activity should not be a bar to holding judicial office it should not be a
prerequisite for it; (6) The people's right ,to select their judges is not
taken away by the judicial nominating commission system because under
,other systems the people are not able to exercise such a right; (7) The
purpose of political competition - to offer the people opposing political
philosophies and programs is inconsistent with the judicial process
which is concerned with the impartial administration of justice and is
not concerned with political philosophies and programs.
Those opposing the judicial nominating commissibn system rely on the
following arguments: (1) Such a system restricts the right of the people
to select their own judges; (2) A lawyer has the right to put his name
before the people for the office of judge; (3) Such a system puts the
selection of judges solely into the hands of lawyers and bar associations;
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History of Judicial Reform

Judicial reform, as was stated by Roscoe Pound in his
famous speech "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice," is as old as law. As he put
it "discontent has an ancient and unbroken pedigree. ' 3 For
example, among the causes of the American Revolution
with the administration of justice in
was a dissatisfaction
4
the Colonies.
All of the constitutions of the original thirteen states
and the Federal Constitution, however, retained a system

for selection and tenure of judges similar to the English
system - appointment by the executive or legislature during good behavior. Some states, including Maryland, added
a requirement that the appointee had to be approved by
the Council. As Jacksonian democracy began to influence
state constitutions in the middle of the Nineteenth Century,
new states coming into the Union usually provided for partisan election of judges who held office for a short term,
and many of the older states amended their constitutions
to provide for a similar scheme.5 These changes reflected
the attitude of the era which held that any man (or at
least any lawyer) was qualified to be a judge, that the

people's right to select their judges should not be encumbered in any way, and that the terms of judges should be
short so that the judges would be more responsive to the
will of the people. Some states found this system to be
inappropriate for the judicial process and reverted back to
(4) Once a person is appointed a judge it is impossible to defeat him
in a non-competitive election even though he may be unqualified; (5)
The present system has proved satisfactory so there is no need to change it.
The arguments on both sides have honorable antecedents. See for example,

Perlman,

DEBATES OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

OF

1867,

304-26 (192) and DEBATES, MARYLAND REFoRm CONVENTION, 459-550 (1851).
aThis speech, delivered at the 1906 annual convention of the American
Bar Association, and generally regarded as the starting point for organized
activity looking to the improvement of the administration of justice, was
See also Winters, The
reprinted in 46 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 54, (1962).
Founding of the Society, Id., 45.
,'Among the acts of the King which were listed in the Declaration of
Independence as justifying the breaking away of the Colonies from the
mother country were the following: "He has tobstructed the administration
of justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers.
He has made judges dependent 'on his will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. * * * For depriving
us in many cases of the benefit of trial by jury: For transporting us
beyond seas to be tried for pretended offences: . . ."
3The most complete review of judicial selection and tenure in the
United States is found in Haynes, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES

(1944). See also

Vanderbilt, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-

Both works were published by The National Conference of
Judicial Councils.
TION (1949).
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some form of executive appointment for longer terms.
Most, however, have retained the basic features of the
elective system but with some modifications such as nonpartisan elections, cross-filing in primaries, filling of temporary vacancies by the executive and lengthening of
judicial terms.
Maryland, in the Constitution of 1776, vested the power
of appointing judges in the Governor and provided for
judges to hold office during good behavior.' The appointments were, however, subject to the confirmation of the
Council. In 1837, when the Council was abolished, judicial
appointments and other executive appointments were made
subject to the approval of the Senate.
Maryland withstood the pressures of "Popularism" until
1851 when the system was completely changed and judges
were elected for a term of ten years in the same manner
as any other elected state official. The Governor was not
given the power to fill any vacancies even on a temporary
basis. In the Constitution of 1864 the Governor was given
the power to fill judicial vacancies which occurred other
than by the expiration of the term of a judge. The term
was extended from ten to fifteen years. Any judicial appointment made by the Governor, however, was again subject to confirmation by the Senate.
In the Constitution of 1867, which (with many amendments) is the constitution still in effect in Maryland, the
Governor was given power to fill most judicial vacancies,
including those arising through the expiration of the elective term of a judge.7 This authority was extended to all
judicial vacancies, no matter how arising, by amendments
adopted in 1881 and 1944.8 In 1941 party designations were
eliminated by statute in judicial general elections. Judicial
candidates are permitted to cross-file in party primaries
thus enabling a judicial candidate to appear on the ballot
of the two major political parties, a practice permitted by
statute since 1943, but limited to judicial candidates. These
I Provisions for appointments for terms of good behavior were quite
common immediately after the Revolution. At the present time only
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey (after an initial appointment of seven years) and the Federal Constitution grant such terms.
See Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 48 A. 2d 754 (1946).
The authority is likewise usually placed in the Governor when additional courts are created. Article IV, Section 41A (People's Court of
Baltimore City) ; Section 41C (Municipal Court of Baltimore City). The
Legislature need not so provide for People's Courts of the dounties.
Article IV, 'Section 41B. On occasions when additional judgeships are
created by an amendment to the Constitution the Legislature often
inserts a provision in the Amendment requiring the newly created
vacancy to be filled initially by election.
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provisions reduced to some extent the effect of a judicial
candidate's membership in a particular political party.9
Under the present system in Maryland when a judicial
vacancy occurs the Governor appoints someone to fill the
vacancy until the first general election after the appointee
has served one year. In the primary for that election the
judge so appointed may or may not run for a full elective
term and other candidates may run for nomination to
run for a full elective term. Since a judge running for
election was restrained somewhat by his office in cam-

paigning for election, and since to many lawyers it
seemed inappropriate for a judge to engage in partisan
politics, the leaders of the Bar soon conceived the "sitting
judge" principle under which the support of the organized
Bar is thrown behind a judge, (including one who has only

recently been appointed by the Governor and who has
never been elected to such office) who is seeking to remain
in office and who has at least demonstrated no incapacity

to hold judicial office.' ° There have been only a few occasions when the "sitting judge" principle has not been
effective to elect those judges who had been appointed by
the Governor."
For many years after the adoption of the Constitution of
1867 the Governor relied only upon the counsel of his own
conscience and his personal and political advisors in filling
judicial vacancies. The Bar Association of Baltimore City
was the first bar association to recommend to the Governor
the names of lawyers qualified to be appointed to a judicial

vacancy. In 1940 Governor Herbert R. O'Conor requested
9 Such cross-filing
is, of course, most important where a large majority
of the voters register in one political party since in such cases a judicial
candidate who is a member of the minority party or an independent may
be nominated by the majority party as well as by his own and may 'be
unopposed in the general election.
10 The justification for this "principle" is that a judge who has served
on the bench is entitled to be elected because he has demonstrated his
capacity to be a judge. This "principle" has been applied to virtually all
appointed judges even though many h'ave served in office only a very
short time before the election (this is particularly true as to the primary
election), and even though the ability demonstrated by the judge may
leave much to be desired. The reason for this is that even though in
practice the "sitting judge" principle may have 6ome defects, it is far
superior to a wide open political campaign for the office of judge in
which a sitting judge must engage in the same type of political activities
as his opponent and, thus, become indebted to political factions and
must risk defeat on the basis of politics, not competence. Some such
protection is required to induce qualified lawyers to accept an appointment
under the present system.
uOne of these occasions was in 1882 which, however, involved a determined effort by the leaders of the Bar to defeat certain sitting judges
who had demonstrated their incapacity to sit on the bench. This story is
related in Johnson, et al, The Sunpapers of Baltimore, Ch. 7 (1937) and
is referred to in Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 48 A. 2d 754 (1946).
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the Maryland State Bar Association to establish a procedure whereby it would recommend to the Governor the
names of lawyers who were qualified to be appointed to
fill a judicial vacancy which had arisen. A committee of
the Association headed by Charles Markell, later Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals, was appointed to devise
such a procedure. This committee formulated such a sys-

tem which was approved by the Association in 1941 and
which is still in effect.'"
In spite of minor improvements such as cross-filing,
bar association recommendations and the "sitting judge"
principle, there has been over the years a substantial
amount of activity both within and without the Maryland
State Bar Association for a major revision of Maryland's

scheme of appointing and electing its judges. Among the
first proposals was that by Judge Morris A. Soper who, in
1920 as President of the Maryland State Bar Association,
called for a complete revision of the Maryland process of
election. His proposals as to the selection and tenure of

judges were based upon the plan of Albert N. Kales, discussed herein, and are quite similar to the ideas incorpo-

rated in the Constitutional Amendment proposed by the
Committee on Judicial Selection. 3 Most recently, in 1956,
a special committee of the Maryland State Bar Association
was appointed to consider this same problem. This committee presented a plan embodying a major change in the
22 Subsequent
to this many of the local bar associations have also
established committees on judicial vacancies which make recommendations
for such vacancies in their respective jurisdictions. This often results in
several different lists being submitted to the Governor by various bar
associations. With such varied lists to choose from, a Governor is
usually able to find on at least one of these lists the name of a politically
acceptable lawyer.
25 Transactions, Md. St. Bar Assoc. 3, 24-27 (1920). Thereafter there
were reports from several commissions: the Judiciary Oommission appointed in 1922 by Governor Albert C. Ritchie of which Charles McHenry
Howard was chairman and which filed its report in 1924; a committee
of the Baltimore City Bar Association of which Joseph C. France was
chairman whose recommendations are reported in 44 Transactions, Md.
,St. Bar Assoc. 41 (1939) and 45 Transactions, Md. St. Bar Assoc. 171
(1940); Committee on Judicial Nominations and Elections of the Maryland State Bar Association whose reports and discussions thereon are
in 44 Transactions, Md. St. Bar Assoc. 41 (1939) and 45 Transactions,
Md. St. Bar Assoc. 60, 171 (1940); the Commission On the Judiciary
Article of the Maryland Constitution (The Bond Commission) appointed in
1941 by Governor Herbert R. O'Conor, whose reports are published in
48 Transactions, Md. 'St. Bar Assoc. 3, 15 (1943) ; and the Commission
to Study the Judiciary of Maryland (The Burke Commission) appointed
by Governor Theodore R. McKeldin whose report filed in 1953 advocated
no immediate changes in the method of selecting judges but which contains an 'appendix prepared by the Reporter of the Commission, Melvin
J. Sykes, which is an excellent review of judicial selection in Maryland
and the various proposals concerning judicial selection in the various
states.
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method of appointing judges but only minor changes in the
method of electing judges. The recommendations of that
committee were rejected at the 1957 annual meeting of the
Maryland State Bar Association. 4
The problem of judicial selection and tenure was again
brought to the attention of the Maryland State Bar Association in a speech to its 1962 annual meeting by Chief
Judge Emory Niles. In this speech Judge Niles, who was
retiring as President of the Maryland State Bar Associa-

tion, called for the adoption in Maryland of a method of
judicial selection embodying two principles: "1. The limitation of judicial appointments to a list presented to the
Governor by a non-partisan nominating commission. 2.
The adoption of a scheme whereby a judge runs against
his record and not against anybody who wants the job."'5
As a result of this speech, the Association adopted a resolu-

tion directing its President to appoint a special committee
to study the proposal made by Judge Niles. The Constitutional Amendment to be discussed herein is the result of
that committee's deliberations.
The JudicialNominating Commission System

Judge Niles' proposals were not, of course, original, and
had been previously suggested to the Association on several
occasions.' The judicial nominating commission - noncompetitive election system for selection and tenure of

judges had, indirectly, its origin in the 1906 speech of Dean
Pound to the American Bar Association because this speech

was one of the factors which gave rise to the formation of
the American Judicature Society in 1913.17 At the first
11The details of that plan are set forth in the final report of the
committee found in 62 Transactions, Md. St. Bar Assoc. 23.5-241 (1957).
Under the plan of that committee, which would be applicable in the first
instance only to the Court of Appeals -and to Baltimore City, a commission of three lawyers and three laymen and the Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals as chairman would nominate three lawyers for a
judicial vacancy, one of whom the Governor would appoint to the
vacancy. The person so appointed would hold office until the first general
election after he had served one year in office. At such general election
the judge so appointed would be eligible to have his name on the ballht
without party designation. Any other person desiring to run for such
office could have his name placed on the ballot by petitions signed by not
less than one percent of the total number of registered voters in the
preceding general election. Included in the one percent had to be at
least ten percent of the lawyers residing in the particular jurisdiction.
If two or more judges were to be elected, a candidate whose name
appeared on the ballot by petition had to designate the judge against
whom he was running. Judicial primary elections would be eliminated
under this plan.
167 Transactions, Md. St. Bar Assoc. 379, 381 (1962).
16Supra, ns. 13, 14.
17
Supra, n. 3.
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meeting of that organization its seven principal areas of
concern were delineated, the first of which was judicial
selection and tenure. One of the first acts of the Society
was to appoint Professor Albert Kales of the Northwestern
University Law School to draft a model state judicial article. The first draft of this article was presented in 1914
and provided for an elected Chief Justice to appoint other
judges who were to be subject to popular vote at regular
intervals thereafter without competition. The National
Municipal League added a requirement that the Chief
Justice choose from nominees of an independent commission. These proposals did not gain substantial recognition
until 1937 when the American Bar Association adopted a
resolution recommending as the most acceptable substitute
for direct election of judges a plan which included (a)
appointment of judges by the executive from a list drawn
up by an independent nominating commission and (b)
submitting the question of whether such judges should be
retained in office for additional terms to be voted on
periodically."i
Missouri became the first state to adopt a constitutional
amendment embodying these two principles when in 1940
the voters of that State approved an amendment to its
Constitution establishing a judicial nominating commission
system for its Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal and
for the two largest cities in Missouri, St. Louis and Kansas
City.19 Efforts to extend the application of this system to
other jurisdictions in Missouri have been stymied by the
refusal of the Missouri Legislature to provide for a method
of submitting the question to the voters of a judicial district.
Since Missouri's initial step, other states have adopted
similar systems. In 1950 Alabama provided for nomination
by a commission for vacancies on the trial court of the

Is Under a system adopted, in 1934 in California, all subsequent vacancies
in its appellate courts are filled by initial appointment by the governor,
subject however, to approval by a qualification commission, with approved appointees being required 'to run in non-competitive elections for
each successive term. Criticism for this variation of the judicial nominating commission system was recited in Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md.
115, 122, 48 A. 2d 754 (1946) citing 28 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 91 (1944). This
criticism was based ton the reluctance of the California commission to
reject a nominee of the governor.
I The most complete account of Missouri's struggle to adopt such a
system and to retain it is contained in Peltason, The Missouri Plan for
the Selection of Judges, 20 Univ. of Mo. Studies, No. 2 (1945). A shorter
but more readily available description of this struggle is found in
Bundschu, The Missouri ?on-PartisanCourt Plan - Selection and Tenure
of Judges, 16 U. of Kan. C. L. Rev. 55 (1947-48).
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City of Birmingham but did not provide for a non-competitive election of such judges. In 1958 the plan was adopted
by the voters of Kansas for its Supreme Court. In 1959
Alaska adopted in its initial constitution a similar system
for all of its trial and appellate courts.2" In 1962 both Iowa
and Nebraska adopted a judicial nominating commission

procedure for all the trial and appellate courts in those
states.

Also in 1962 Illinois amended its constitution to

enable judges to be retained in office by a majority vote at
a non-competitive election. No change was made, however,

in its system of judicial selection, which is by partisan
election. In 1963 the legislatures of several additional states
will be asked to consider the judicial nominating commission system for their respective states. There are movements in almost one-half of the remaining states seeking
the adoption of such a system in those states. 1
In 1959, under the auspices of the American Bar Association, the American Judicature Society and the Institute
of Judicial Administration, a National Conference on Judicial Selection and Court Administration was held in Chicago, attended by over a hundred laymen, lawyers, judges
and law school professors from all over the United States.

As to the proper system of the selection of judges, this
conference approved the judicial nominating commission
system as the best plan yet devised.22
In 1962 the American Bar Association adopted a resolution recommending to the states a model judicial article

-4 Alaska has provided for only one judicial nominating commission for
all of its courts, apparently bceause it was thought that one such commission was adequate where there were so few people, and, consequently,
so few lawyers and judges.
2146 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 123 (1962).
2 The consensus of the conference stated: 'The objective of each method
of selection should be to obtain judges free of political bias and possessed
of qualities that will lead to the highest performance of their judicial
duties.
"It is indispensable to the proper functioning of the judicial system
'that men who are to be elevated to the bench be selected solely on merit,
on the basis of their qualifications for judicial office. In the process
of their selection as well as in their work and tenure they must be free
of all collateral influence and partisan political pressures." The consensus
went on to recommend: "The American Bar Association plan affords the
means of avoiding 'the weaknesses in other existing methods, while retaining their desirable features. It provides for the filling of judicial
vacancies by appointment by the governor from nominations submitted
by a non-partisan commission composed of lawyers, judges and laymen.
Tenure of judges so appointed is subject only to vote of the people at a
non-competitive election. This relieves the judge from the necessity of
campaigning for office against opposing candidates, but still requires him
to answer to the electorate. These two distinctive features 'tend to assure
selection and retention of the best qualified judges." 45 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y
1, 9-10 (1962).
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for state constitutions prepared by its Section on Judicial
Administration which also embodied these same basic
features.
Proposed ConstitutionalAmendment
The Committee on Judicial Selection of the Maryland
State Bar Association upon its appointment first considered
whether there was, in fact, any need to change the present
system in Maryland, as was suggested by Judge Niles, or
whether the present system had worked sufficiently well
so that there was no reason to change. The latter position
is advocated by some persons and was the attitude partly
responsible for the rejection of the recommendations of
the special Maryland State Bar Association committee in
1957. The Committee also considered whether any minor
improvements in the present system would be sufficient to
cure any alleged defects in that system. The Committee,
after careful consideration, unanimously came to the conclusion that the present system in Maryland was in need
of a major revision and that minor alterations in that
system would not be sufficient to cure or protect against
those evils which were possible under it. After considering
all possible methods of judicial selection and tenure, the
Committee came to the tentative conclusion that a judicial
nominating commission - non-competitive election system
would be best for Maryland. Before finally adopting this
conclusion, however, the Committee delegated one of its
members to spend several days in Missouri discussing the
operation of the Missouri system with persons of as many
different callings and backgrounds as it was possible to
arrange. The report filed with the Committee convinced
the Committee that it should recommend for adoption in
Maryland a judicial nominating commission - non-competitive election system adapted to Maryland's needs.
The Constitutional Amendment as drafted by the Committee contemplates the addition to the Judiciary Article of
the Maryland Constitution, Article IV, of a new Part VIII
entitled "Judicial Nominating Commissions" consisting of
eleven sections. The first section, which will be Section 46
of Article IV, provides that on the occurrence of any vacancy on the Court of Appeals or on any other court made
subject to the provisions of the Amendment, the judicial
nominating commission for that court will nominate three
persons (two in smaller jurisdictions) for the vacancy,
one of whom shall be appointed by the Governor. 23 The
persons must, of course, have the qualifications otherwise
2 These
established in the Constitution for the judges of the various courts. Md.
Constitution, Article IV, §§ 2, 21, 40, 41A, 41B, 41C.
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language used in the Amendment listing the various ways
in which a vacancy can arise, i.e., death, resignation, expiration of term, etc., is the same as that used in Section 5
of Article IV which establishes the present procedure for
the filling of most judicial vacancies. The same language
was used so that there can be no dispute as to the application of the two sections. It was thought that if some
simpler language were used, such as "upon the occurrence
of any vacancy through expiration of a term or otherwise," an argument could be made that there might be
some vacancy to which Section 5 would apply that Section 46 would not. The number of nominees is fixed at
three for most jurisdictions because of the conviction of
the Committee that a list of nominees which is either too
large or too small could create difficult problems. Such
a number allows the Governor several choices without
making the list so large as to make it almost meaningless, and it is the number usually provided for in other
state constitutions and has apparently worked well.
It is next provided that the nominating commission
must make the nominations for a vacancy not more than
thirty days prior to, nor more than sixty days after, the occurrence of any vacancy. It was considered that where it
is known in advance that a vacancy will occur, such as upon
the expiration of the term of a judge who does not seek
re-election, the length of time for which lawyers could be
nominees for the vacancy should be limited. Such a status
would have an effect on a lawyer's practice and it might
perhaps be somewhat embarrassing for the retiring judge
to have his successor or nominee as his successor appearing
before him in court. The limitation also shortens the time
in which political pressures can be brought to bear upon
the Governor to appoint a particular nominee. The sixty
day limitation after the occurrence of the vacancy gives
the nominating commission sufficient time to make nominations for a vacancy which occurs unexpectedly, but prevents a vacancy from remaining unfilled for an unduly
long period of time. The last sentence in this section provides that if the Governor fails to make a nomination
within thirty days after receiving notification of the nominations, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals shall make
the appointment. The purpose of the provision is to avoid
an unhappy situation which developed in Missouri when
the Governor refused to appoint from the list of nominees
submitted by the nominating commission and required the
commission to nominate three other persons more to his
liking. It is not expected that any chief judge will ever
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have the opportunity to exercise this power since it is
most unlikely that any Governor will refuse to make an
appointment knowing that if he does not someone else will.
Section 47 outlines the procedure whereby the General
Assembly or the voters of a county, judicial circuit or
Baltimore City may elect to have the nominating commission procedure made applicable to their respective jurisdictions. The Committee spent a great deal of time studying and discussing the question of the jurisdictions to which
the Amendment should be made applicable. Judge Niles in
his speech advocated that the plan should be made applicable to the Court of Appeals and to the City of Baltimore
and the special committee of the Maryland State Bar
Association in 1957 also included the Court of Appeals and
the City of Baltimore in the original application of its plan.
The Committee rejected the idea of making any court or
jurisdiction other than the Court of Appeals subject to the
Amendment in the first instance, even though the Committee was strongly of the opinion that the Amendment
should be made applicable to the courts of Baltimore City
and of the counties surrounding Baltimore City and the
District of Columbia. There were two reasons for this
apparent inconsistency. The first is that the Committee
thought that the application of the Amendment to any particular jurisdiction should be decided by the voters of that
jurisdiction rather than by the voters in the rest of the
State who would be expected to have little or no connection with the courts of that jurisdiction..2 4 The second, a
more practical one, was that the Committee was of the
opinion the Amendment would be more acceptable if it
was primarily a local option measure in the first instance.
It is also provided that the Amendment may from time
to time be made applicable to some or all of the courts in
a particular jurisdiction. The Committee did not think it
wise to limit the applicability of the Amendment to only
the courts of general jurisdiction and to prohibit the inclusion of courts of limited jurisdiction such as the Municipal
Court of Baltimore City, People's Courts and even Orphans'
Courts. With the increasing number of such courts throughout the State and the almost constant efforts to enlarge the
24 The
Committee had before it the recent experience of the deletion
from Section 41A of Article IV of the provision which called for noncompetitive election of judges of the People's Court of Baltimore City.
The Amendment changing the non-competitive election to a partisan
political election did not carry Baltimore City but the votes in favor of it
in 'the remainder Df the State were sufficient to adopt it. The interest of
a voter in such counties as Allegany or Wicomico in the method whereby
Baltimore City re-elects its People's Court judges is at best limited.
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jurisdiction of these courts, it was thought advisable to
permit maximum flexibility in the application of the
Amendment. It was also the purpose of the Committee by
this section to permit a jurisdiction which at one time
adopts the Amendment for some of its courts to include
other courts within the Amendment at a later time, if the
voters of that jurisdiction are satisfied with its effect upon
the selection of judges for those courts under the Amendment. A prohibition against a jurisdiction or court once
subject to the Amendment from being withdrawn from its
application except by another constitutional amendment
is also included. It was felt that to permit such a withdrawal by the same procedure established for the application of the Amendment would only enable a political
machine at an election which incites little interest among
the voters to bring back the old system of selecting judges
and that this would defeat the purpose of the Amendment.
In addition, if such withdrawal were permitted, judges appointed when the Amendment was effective could possibly
continue to be subject to non-competitive election for retention in office and, thus, judges of the same court could
be subject to re-election under different procedures.2 5
The Amendment may be made applicable to the courts
of Baltimore City or of any county in the third, fourth,
fifth, sixth and seventh judicial circuits or to the Circuit
Court for the first or second judicial circuits.2 6 The question of whether the courts of a jurisdiction are to be subject
to the Amendment can be decided by the General Assembly
or by the voters of the particular jurisdiction. This question can be placed on the ballot at a general election either
by the General Assembly or by the use of the initiative
petition such as is provided for submitting to the voters
the issue of whether a county should adopt home rule.2
The difficulties which have arisen in other states because
of the reluctance of legislatures to permit local voters to
vote on this question make the latter procedure necessary.
This is particularly true where, as here, the Amendment
will in the first instance be applicable only to the Court
of Appeals.
The next section of the Amendment outlines the procedure for the non-competitive election of judges of courts
mSuch is now the present unhealthy situation on the People's Court of
Baltimore City.
I It is not possible to have counties in the first and second judicial
circuits adopt the Amendment for those counties because each county
in the circuit does not elect its own judge. In the third, fourth, fifth, sixth
and seventh judicial circuits each county has at least one judge.
2 Md. Constitution, Article XI-A, § 1.
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subject to the Amendment. The first part of the section provides that a judge appointed pursuant to the Amendment
shall hold office until the December 31st after the first general election held one year after his appointment. This provision is almost the same as is provided for judges appointed under the present Constitution. 28 At that general
election, and at the general election next preceding the expiration of the judge's full elective term providing he certifies his candidacy for an additional term, the judge's
name appears on the ballot without party designation and
without opposition.2 9 The sole question presented to the
voters is whether the judge should be retained in office for
an additional term. The exact language is not specified in
the Amendment because the Committee did not think that
it was necessary to include such detail. It is contemplated, however, that language basically the same as that
included in the constitutions of other states will be used,
nam ely, "Shall Judge ........................ of the ............................
Court be retained in office for a term of ................ years."
It is also provided in this section that judges appointed
or elected to a court prior to the application of the Amendment to that court will be retained in office in the same
manner as a judge appointed under the Amendment. It
can be argued that if it is necessary to change the present
method of selecting judges because the judges chosen under that system are not the best available, such judges
should not be the beneficiaries of the protections afforded
by the Amendment to judges chosen in accordance therewith." The Committee, after much consideration, decided
that it would be better to include such judges in the noncompetitive election procedure for several reasons. Among
them were: (a) the Amendment is directed at improving
the selection process, not at removing judges selected under
the present procedures; (b) if a judge is unqualified for
office he can be defeated in a non-competitive election; and
28Md. Constitution, Article IV, § 5.
No similar requirement Df certification is made for recently appointed
judges who are being voted on for the first time. It is assumed that any
judge accepting an appointment would not accept such an appointment
if he did not plan to stand for a full term. If his personal circumstances
prevent him from running he must resign.
1 The one criticism which was heard in Missouri of its selection and
retention plan was that it was too difficult to remove those judges whom
some thought to be unqualified. In every instance the judge whom it was
alleged was unqualified was one who had originally been elected to office
prior to the adoption of the Missouri Plan in 1940.
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(c) it would be best not to have judges on the same court
31
subject to different procedures for re-election to office.
The fifteen year term for the judges of the Court of
Appeals, circuit courts and of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City creates a problem where such a judge runs for
re-election under the Amendment. Section 48 provides that
a judge who desires to serve a second fifteen year term must
run for re-election at the general election which next precedes the expiration of his original term. Because his term
would have begun on the January 1st after the general
election at which he was first elected, his term would expire
on the December 31st which is almost 14 months after the
general election at which he must run for re-election. When
a judge is re-elected, it will be unimportant that for 14
months after his re-election he is still serving out his old
term. However, when a judge is defeated for re-election,
it seemed to the Committee most inappropriate to have the
judge remain on the bench 14 months until his term expires.
It is provided therefore, that if a judge is defeated his term
ends upon the certification of his defeat and a vacancy is
then created. 2
One of the most difficult problems in any judicial election, whether it be competitive or non-competitive, is for
the average voter to assess intelligently the judicial qualifications of a person whom he does not know and has never
seen perform in court. Missouri and other states have
adopted a procedure which to some extent cures this problem. Prior to any judicial election in these states a poll is
taken by the appropriate bar association of all lawyers in
the jurisdiction in which the judge is running for election
on the question of whether the judge should be retained
in office. 33 In Missouri if a judge receives a favorable vote
of a majority of those voting on this question, the chairmen
of the state and local Republican and Democratic parties
jointly endorse the judge for re-election and committees
similar to the committees for the election of the sitting
judges in Maryland are then formed to support the candidacy of the judge. It would seem that some such procedure
would be desirable in any state in which judges are reelected in a non-competitive election and thus it is provided
"ISupra, n. 25.
32It may be that

the better way to handle this problem is to have the
terms for such judges fixed for an even number of years. The Committee
was of the opinion, however, that proposals for changes in the term of
judges should not be made until after the Amendment is in operation.
'3This
procedure is simpler in Missouri than it would be in Maryland
because Missouri has an integrated bar.
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in section 54 that the Court of Appeals shall prescribe
rules for such polls. 4
Section 49 establishes the Court of Appeals Nominating
Commission which will be composed of 15 members including one lawyer and one layman from each of the five
appellate judicial circuits outside of Baltimore City and
two lawyers and two laymen from Baltimore City and the
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals who will be Chairman. This gives each appellate judicial circuit two members on the Commission for each judge of the Court of
Appeals from that appellate judicial circuit. The terms of
the members of the Commission will be seven years and
will be staggered so that the terms of two members, one
lawyer and one layman from different appellate judicial
circuits, will expire each year.
At first glance it would appear that the membership
of this commission is unduly large since nominating commissions in other states are usually limited to seven members. The Committee thought it important, however, to
have both lawyer and lay representation from each appellate judicial circuit. To have had only one member from
each of these circuits would mean that either the public or
the bar of each of the circuits would be unrepresented on
the Commission. This the Committee thought was undesirable, particularly for the circuit which has a vacancy on
the Court of Appeals. In addition, members of the Court
of Appeals Nominating Commission will be ex-officio members of local nominating commissions, as will be explained
below, and thus there is a reason outside of the Commission
itself for such a large membership. Further, the experience
of the Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Judicial Appointments, which often sits with eleven or twelve
members, has not indicated that this number is unwieldy.
The next section provides for the formation of local
nominating commissions. For a county the commission will
be comprised of two lawyers and two laymen from that
county, the lawyer and layman on the Court of Appeals
Nominating Commission from the appellate judicial circuit in which the county is located and the chairman, who
will be the senior resident judge in that county, thus
making a commission of seven members. In the event the
county has no senior resident judge, for whatever reason,
14 It
has been proposed that one of the ways in which it could be made
less difficult to defeat a judge in a non-competitive election is to raise
the precentage of favorable votes in a bar poll which a judge must receive
before the organized bar will support his bid for re-election. The adoption
of such a requirement should be, perhaps, by rule of the Court of Appeals
regulating bar polls.
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the chairman of the commission will be the chief judge of
the judicial circuit in which the county is located. A judicial circuit nominating commission is made up in the
same way except that the local members need only be
from the judicial circuit and not a particular county, and
the chairman will always be the chief judge of that circuit."
The organization of the county and judicial circuit commissions is such that the members of a commission from a
particular county or judicial circuit will always have a
majority vote on the commission, and thus the local representatives on the commission who are most concerned with
judicial vacancies in that county or judicial circuit can
determine the nominees of the commission. This local
representation is increased on a county commission where
the judge who is the chairman of the commission resides in
that particular county. The judge who is chairman of a
circuit commission must, of course, always reside in that
circuit. The inclusion of members of the Court of Appeals
Nominating Commission from the appellate judicial circuit in which the county or judicial circuit is located is
designed to give representation on the commission to those
interests which are legitimately concerned with the selection of judges in any local jurisdiction. A circuit court
judge from a particular county can and often does sit in
counties in his circuit other than his home county and thus
the remainder of the circuit has a substantial interest in
the quality of a circuit judge from a particular county.
Likewise, a circuit judge can be assigned to sit in some
other circuit of the State by the Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals or can be assigned to sit temporarily on the
Court of Appeals itself. In addition, residents of one county
or circuit are often involved in litigation in another county
or circuit and such litigants have a very real interest in the
ability of the judge who is to rule on their claims or defenses. The county and circuit commissions, therefore,
represent primarily the interests of those most immediately
concerned with the judge to be appointed but also represent
those who have a similar but usually less immediate
interest.
In addition to the two lay and lawyer members of the
Court of Appeals Nominating Commission, the Baltimore
City Nominating Commission is composed of one additional
layman and one additional lawyer from Baltimore City and
the Chief Judge of the Supreme Bench, who will be the
I The chief judge 'of a judicial circuit is not appointed by the Governor
as such, but he is always the senior judge of that circuit. Md. Constitution, Article IV, § 21.
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Chairman. It was thought desirable to include members
over and above those who are members of the Court of
Appeals Nominating Commission from Baltimore City. A
commission so limited would consist of only five members
and this would be too small in view of the number of
judgeships in Baltimore City, particularly if either or both
the Municipal Court and People's Court are included within
the application of the Amendment.
The terms of members of local commissions other than
those who are ex-officio members will be three years. This
means that some members of local commissions will have
terms of seven years (those who are members of such a
commission by reason of their membership on the Court
of Appeals Nominating Commission), and some members
will have terms of three years. It did not appear to the
Committee that this presented any substantial problem but,
on the contrary, that it was desirable to have the terms of
local members shorter so that those members who are from
counties or circuits which have quite limited populations
would not be restricted in their governmental and political
activities for an unduly long period of time.
Section 51 merely provides that in the event of a vacancy in the office of Chief Judge of either the Court of
Appeals or of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City the
duties prescribed for such offices by the Amendment will
be performed by the senior associate judges of such courts.
In Section 52 it is provided that the lay members of the
various nominating commissions will be appointed by the
Governor from the qualified voters of the respective jurisdictions. This means that a lay member must reside in the
jurisdiction which he represents on a commission. Lay
members, by definition may not be practicing lawyers as
that term is defined in the Amendment and it is further
provided that they shall be chosen without reference to
political party affiliations.
This last provision indirectly reflects a concern for what
could be the one effective way in which the entire purpose
and intent of the Amendment might possibly be thwarted
by a Governor whose concept of the judiciary was limited
to regarding it merely as another source of political patronage. The Committee, by including language requiring that
appointments to nominating commissions not be based upon
political considerations, is not too hopeful that an obvious
political appointment would be set aside in the courts. It
would involve some temerity for a judge to set aside an
appointment because it was an attempt to introduce political factors into the selection of the judiciary. It must be
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emphasized, nevertheless, that the sole purpose of the
Amendment as drafted by the Committee, and certainly
the only reason for an affirmative vote thereon by the
voters of the State, is to remove from the judicial selection
and election process any influence of partisan politics or
of personal favoritism. The type of person appointed to
the commissions, if the commissions are to succeed in their
mission, must be one whose judgment is independent,
whose experience is broad, and who has no private interest
other than the common good or objective other than obtaining for the State of Maryland the best qualified lawyers
to hold judicial office.
Much thought was given by the Committee as to
whether the dangers recited above could be avoided by the
establishment of various qualifications for the lay members
of the commissions by requiring the membership to be bipartisan rather than non-partisan, or providing for exofficio members, such as presidents of educational institutions, financial institutions, labor leaders, etc. The Committee finally decided that no such qualifications or list of
ex-officio members would be desirable. The problem is
complicated by the fact that there could be a total of 18
nominating commissions if Baltimore City, the First and
Second Judicial Circuits and all of the counties in the other
circuits elected to have nominating commissions for their
judges. Reliance is placed, therefore, on the good judgment
of the Governor and his respect for the possible adverse
effects on his record and reputation which would result
from making appointments inconsistent with the spirit and
purpose of the Amendment, such as the appointment of
persons who are politically or personally indebted to the
Governor, or to whom the Governor is so indebted. It is
reasonable to expect that under the proposed system which
expressly forbids the action an improper appointment by
the Governor would have such adverse effects, even though
under the present system which contains no such prohibition a Governor's judicial appointments do not often cause
him any political disadvantage.
The election of lawyer members of the various nominating commissions is provided for in Section 53. The nominating procedure for lawyer members for each type of nominating commission is basically the same. A committee
composed of officers of the local bar associations in the
jurisdiction to be represented by the commission and the
President of the Maryland State Bar Association serve as
a nominating committee for lawyers for vacancies on the
commission. It is also possible for a lawyer to be nominated
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for a vacancy upon the petition of a percentage of the lawyers in that jurisdiction. The nomination by bar association officers procedure was adopted by the Committee because it felt that it would result in a more orderly procedure for the election of lawyer members of a commission.
The nomination by petition provision was inserted to prevent any small group of lawyers from controlling the nomination of lawyer members by controlling a bar association.
The petition procedure is, however, a two-edged weapon.
Its primary purpose is to prevent the domination of a commission by persons whose self interest is their sole concern.
It can, however, be used to provide just another opportunity for partisan political activity or for popularity contests among members of the bar. Such exercise would most
clearly be a misuse.
It is provided that the nominating committee may make
one, two, or three nominations for each vacancy on a commission. This is designed to permit some flexibility in the
manner in which the nominating procedure will operate
in practice. There will be many instances where the lawyers in a particular jurisdiction are virtually unanimous in
desiring to have a certain lawyer serve on a commission.
In such case no purpose would be served by nominating
more than one person for the vacancy. This would be particularly true in the smaller jurisdictions to which the
Amendment may be made applicable." It may be, however, that the members of a local bar feel that they ought
to be given a choice between two or three nominees for
such an important position. In such case it would be
entirely proper for a nominating committee to nominate
more than one lawyer for each vacancy. It is also provided that any candidate, however proposed, must be
nominated for a particular vacancy. This will be particularly important when a jurisdiction first comes under the
Amendment and there will be two positions for which the
nominating committee for that jurisdiction must propose
candidates. In such a case a nominee by petition might
have a great advantage if he need not designate the position for which he is running. 7 It would probably be desirable also for the Court of Appeals to require that a lawyer
-"Bar associations in this State have a well known tendency toward
unopposed nominations for officers of the various associations.
3T This
practice has been quite common recently in judicial elections,
particularly where several new judgeships are created or where a new
court is created. The supporters of a particular candidate can then vote
only for him and not for any other candidates, even though there may
be six or seven vacancies, and thus make their vote count more heavily
than if they had voted for as many candidates as there are vacancies.
This practice is commonly known as "single shooting."
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must receive a majority vote for election to a commission
and to provide for a run-off election between the two highest candidates if no candidate receives a clear majority. If
this is not required, two candidates of similar qualifications
may split a majority of the vote, and a lawyer unacceptable
to the majority might then be elected.
The membership of the nominating committees for lawyer members was designed to give as wide a representation
as possible on a committee without making it unduly large.
It seemed most appropriate to have each jurisdiction represented by the president of the largest local bar association.
Although in most cases there is only one bar association,
in certain jurisdictions in the State, particularly in Baltimore City, there is more than one bar association. Rather
than attempting to have all such bar associations represented on the nominating committee, it was thought most
practical to have only the largest bar association in each
jurisdiction represented on the nominating committee. It
is expected that most lawyers will be eligible to join the
bar association which is the largest and, therefore, these
associations would be the most representative. It seemed
to the Committee a hopeless task to attempt to give representation to each bar association no matter how small, no
matter what special interest the association represented
and no matter how limited the number of lawyers eligible
to join the association might be.
The responsibility of the members of the bar in electing
their fellow members to act on behalf of the legal profession as members of commissions is just as great as the
responsibility of the Governor in selecting lay members of
the commissions. If a Governor succumbs to political temptation when dealing with judicial nominating commissions
his conduct can perhaps be explained by the fact that he is
the chief executive and has many responsibilities other
than those connected with the selection of judges and is
subject to strong political pressures. The lawyer, however,
when he is acting as such in selecting other lawyers as
representatives of the bar has no such other responsibilities.
His sole function should be to elect only that type of person whom he feels will act in the best interests of the bar,
the judiciary and the public.
The Amendment uses the term "practicing lawyer" in
describing those lawyers who are eligible to elect and be
elected lawyer members of nominating commissions. This
term is defined in Section 54 to include those lawyers whose
primary activity is as an attorney actually engaged in the
practice of law or who hold an official position connected
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with the legal profession or the courts. It seemed to the
Committee that those persons whose primary activity is
not as an attorney or intimately connected with the legal
profession should not qualify as a lawyer under the Amendment. The legal profession is given representation on the
nominating commissions equal to that of the rest of the
public. Those whose principal or sole connection with the
legal profession is that they were once admitted to practice
by the Court of Appeals is not, in the opinion of the Committee, sufficient to entitle them to such preferential
representation.
The Amendment also deems that a lawyer is of the
jurisdiction in which he maintains his principal office for
the practice of his profession. The Committee had to choose
between basing this status upon the place of residence of
the lawyer or the place where the lawyer maintains his
office. The Committee decided that since a lawyer is, for
the purposes of the Amendment, considered solely in his
capacity as a lawyer and not as a citizen or a voter that
the place where he practices his profession was the logical
place in which he should participate in the judicial selection
process established by the Amendment.
The Court of Appeals, in addition to regulation "straw"
polls among lawyers, is also given the power to adopt procedures for the election of lawyer members of nominating
commissions to the same extent that it has power to adopt
rules of practice and procedure. It is contemplated that
the Court will adopt rules for the entire process, including
both nominating and election procedures.
Section 55 lays down a number of rules for activities of the commissions, the most important of which is
the prohibition against members of nominating commissions holding any public office of profit (other than that of
Notary Public) or political office while a member of a
commission and for six months thereafter. The basic purpose of this prohibition is to prevent any outside influence
being brought to bear upon a member of a commission
because of any political or public office he might hold. The
prohibition is limited to public office of profit because it
was felt that the chances of any influence on a commission
member because of his holding a public office which entitled him to no compensation was not likely to interfere
with his commission duties. Likewise, the type of person
who would be the most desirable to have on such commission is the same type that is most often appointed to nonpaying public positions. In using the term "public office of
profit" the Committee was of the opinion that the term
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would not apply to the employment by a state agency of
an attorney as counsel to that agency merely in a private
capacity and not as a state employee." The term political
office is intended to include the officers and members of
state central committees, political agents, financial agents
and even officers of local political organizations, such as
ward or district political groups. 9
The last section, 56, is a statement that the subtitle
shall supersede all provisions of Article IV inconsistent
with the subtitle. This is inserted to insure that no dispute arises as to the application of the subtitle to a particular judicial vacancy.
The proposals of the Committee as incorporated in the
Constitutional Amendment are the result of many long
hours of study and deliberation by its members. The
Amendment is designed to provide Maryland with a system
of selection and tenure of judges which has only one purpose - a judiciary made up of the lawyers best qualified
to sit on the bench. The proposed Amendment now awaits
discussion and approval by the members of the Maryland
State Bar Association before being submitted for the final
approval of the Legislature and the people of Maryland.
asExamples of 'the former would be activities such as bond counsel
on state bond issues and counsel specially retained by state agencies for
a limited purpose such as local counsel for the State Roads Commission.
In the latter group would be included such positions as Special Assistant
Attorneys General.
19Sometimes the distinction between a political organization and a civic
organization grows somewhat blurred. One bit of evidence would be the
status of the organization under the Internal Revenue Code.

